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Abstract: Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is a specific proposal in the international legal debate, the 
goal of which is the application of constitutional principles at the global level to achieve the universal 
guarantee of human rights. The author proposes that if we want to respond to the question of whether this 
project is possible and desirable, we need to analyse whether this is a plausible proposal, considering the 
distinctive features of law in the transnational sphere. In this light, the principal aim of this work is to 
show the principal challenges that Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism presents for the classic debates of legal 
philosophy, considering the current conditions of the international sphere. In this paper, the three topics 
that are considered are the debates between morality and law, law and power, and law and unity. The topics 
are problematized from the perspective of two contemporary scholars of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism: 
Luigi Ferrajoli and Jürgen Habermas.
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1. IntroductIon
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is a specific proposal in the international legal 
debate, the goal of which is the application of constitutional principles at the global level 
to achieve the universal guarantee of human rights. The academic discussion regarding 
this concept has been focus on the analysis of its practical possibilities of implementation 
considering the characteristics of the global landscape. I propose that a productive 
path that could be followed to debate the possibilities would be to study the impact of 
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism in critical debates of legal philosophy.
1 An earlier version of this work was presented at the XXIX IVR World Congress, Workshop “Globalization 
as a challenge to Legal Philosophy” (Lucerne, Switzerland). I am grateful to Javier Ansuátegui, Isabel 
Turégano and Gulshan Khan for their feedback at different stages in the writing of this article.
2 Phd Student (University Carlos III Madrid). Instructor at Human Rights Center (University of Chile) 
cnunez@derecho.uchile.cl. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0152-9339
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Traditionally, legal philosophy and constitutionalism were thought of and 
built through the lens of the state. However, if we want to develop a project such as 
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, we need to analyse whether it is necessary to change 
our comprehension of the main topics of legal philosophy by analysing the features of 
the law beyond the state. Considering this problem, the principal objective of this work 
will be to show the principal challenges that Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism presents 
for the classic debates of legal philosophy in the light of the current conditions of the 
international sphere. The key topics are the relationship between morality and law, unity 
and law, and law and power.
To carry out this task, firstly, a conceptual framework of Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism will be presented. This is a necessary analytical exercise because, in the 
relevant literature, there are many approaches regarding the idea. So, the first step in the 
research is to explain what Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is and its foundations. In the 
second part of the research the three main debates of legal philosophy will be presented 
from the perspective of two contemporary scholars: Luigi Ferrajoli and Jürgen Habermas. 
I have chosen these scholars because they have developed a normative proposal of law and 
democracy that culminates with a cosmopolitan aspiration as part of a broader reflection 
in the context of a general theory.
By examining these questions, I will be able to respond to the question of whether 
it is possible to construct the project of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism through a new 
comprehension of legal philosophy in transnational and cosmopolitan terms.
2. cosmopolItan constItutIonalIsm: concept and characterIstIcs
2.1. The uses of constitutional language in the international legal debate
The language of constitutionalism is often referred to in several ways in academic 
debates related to the global scenario.3 A variety of different expressions are used, such 
as “global constitutionalism”,4 “transnational constitutionalism” (Neves, 2013), “world 
constitutionalism” (MacDonald & Johnston, 2005), “multilevel constitutionalism”5 and 
“cosmopolitan constitutionalism” (Kumm, 2013). These expressions are sometimes used 
synonymously, but at other times they are used to represent different approaches to the 
question of whether it is possible to use constitutional language beyond state margins. As 
3 A broader perspective on the uses of constitutional language can be found in (Schwöbel, 2011; Lang & 
Wiener, 2017; and Diggelmann & Altwicker, 2008).
4 This is the most common expression, and it is defined by Peters as “an academic an political agenda 
that identifies and advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the international legal 
sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal order” (Peters, 2009: 
397). This expression encompasses many different approaches to this matter and has been presented as an 
interdisciplinary approach. See in this respect the first editorial of the journal “Global constitutionalism”. 
The concept is also used in a critical perspective by Schwöbel (2011).
5 The expression “multilevel constitutionalism” is often used to refer to the relations between autonomous 
legal systems that belong to a broader legal system, such as the European Union. See Pernice (2012).
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Rodrigo points out, all that is a signal that “world constitutionalism” is a controversial 
concept that does not have only one version (Rodrigo, 2014: 13).
The distinction that is proposed here between descriptive and normative 
approaches is based on the analysis of the main purpose of each perspective when they 
use the constitutional language beyond the state. The descriptive approaches seek to 
find constitutional traits in structures and in international norms. They either highlight 
the existence of a “Constitutionalization” process in the international scenario, or show 
the existence of a “World Constitution”6 using the analogy as a strategy. The normative 
perspective uses the “Constitutionalization” perspective but goes beyond it, because it looks 
forward and tries to study the aspects we have to develop to transform constitutionalism 
into a reality beyond the state. The main purpose of this approach is to propose or suggest 
criteria to resolve the problems related to the creation and legitimacy of law.7 So, if we 
use the distinction between the concepts8 “Constitution”,9 “Constitutionalization”10 and 
“Constitutionalism”,11 we can argue that the first two concepts are more involved with 
descriptive approaches, and the normative perspectives are more centered on developing 
“Constitutionalism” as a project. In these distinctions, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is 
characterized as a normative project,12 although it uses descriptive elements to argue about 
the possibilities of the project.
Why did we use the expression “Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism” and not “Global 
Constitutionalism)? Even though “Global Constitutionalism” is more often used within 
the context of these debates, I use the expression Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism for 
conceptual and pragmatic reasons. For conceptual reasons, I use it because, as will be 
6 Verdross has been considered as the “founding father” of the World Constitution discourse (Kleinlein, 
2012a) because his concepts related to the international community and ius cogens norms were important in 
the development of a constitutional frame of analysis of public international law (Verdross, 1964). Currently, 
these ideas are sustained concerning the United Nations Charter (Fassbender, 1998) and in relation to ius 
cogens norms (De Wet, 2006).
7 The distinction between the normative and descriptive approaches used to analyse the debate on global 
constitutionalism is used by Klabbers to define the objectives of his book (2009a: 1-44).
8 These three concepts are used by Peters &Armigeon (2009); Peters (2008: 386-387); and Bodansky (2009: 
565-584). These three concepts are also relevant to characterize the debates in the Global Constitutionalism 
journal, see Wiener, Lang &Tully (2012: 4-6).
9 In the international field the use of the word “Constitution” has been helped by the distinction between 
written and non-written Constitutions, and even when we consider that in the scholarly field we do not have 
a common comprehension of the content of the Constitution, it is an approach that pretends to be different 
to the international legalization approach because the Constitution is a creative and constitutive statute of 
public authority. A study about the different approaches to the “Constitution” concept at the international 
level can be found in Diggelmann & Altwicker (2008).
10 In regard to constitutionalization, it is possible to establish that this concept refers to the process inspired 
in constitutionalism, which is the “catchword for the continuing process of the emergence, creation, and 
identification of constitution-like elements in the international legal order” (Peters, 2006: 582).
11 Constitutionalism, as a political philosophy applied in the international field, can be described, as it is by 
many scholars, as a “frame of mind” (Klabbers, 2009a; Koskenniemi, 2007a), that is to say, a structure or 
frame of thought that involves three ideas: power limit, guarantee of rights, and legitimate authority.
12 Another approach that can be identified as normative in these terms is “organic global constitutionalism”, 
which is sustained by Schwöbel (2011).
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presented, there exists a conceptual, historical, and empirical connection between these 
two ideas. Additionally, it is important to use the “cosmopolitan” adjective because the 
use of “global” as a concept carries the risk of missing out the prescriptive content of 
cosmopolitanism (Cortés & Piedrahita, 2011: 226). The “global” denomination has 
also been used to describe the effects of globalization within the Law or to talk about 
neoliberal policies; globalism has hidden under an apparent neutrality a certain ideology 
that implies deregulation and liberalization (Fariñas, 2012) and it is not necessarily linked 
with cosmopolitan principles.
2.2. Concept and characteristics
The following characterization of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism as a project 
is a reconstruction of its arguments, departing from the relevant literature regarding the 
concept. Within this project, there are two main approaches. We find that scholars have 
arrived at this concept by reflecting on law and democracy (in the context of a general 
reflection on the political philosophy and legal philosophy); and other scholars have 
developed this concept through specific reflections on the constitutional character of 
the international arena. In the first group we found scholars like Habermas (1997; 1998; 
2006; 2008; 2012; 2013a; 2014; 2015) and Ferrajoli (1998; 2004; 2008; 2011; 2018a). 
Both develop a normative proposal as part of a broader theory of law and democracy that 
culminates with a cosmopolitan aspiration. In the second group ,we find scholars such as 
Kumm (2004; 2009; 2013; 2016), Peters (2006; 2009a; 2009b), Brown (2012; 2013), Bryde 
(2005), Petersmann (2013a; 2013b; 2017), Corradetti (2016, 2017), Stone-Sweet &Ryan 
(2018) and Benhabib (2006, 2011, 2016), whose work emphasizes the reconstruction of a 
specific hermeneutic frame to comprehend the relation between international and national 
relationships in constitutional and cosmopolitan terms.
Even though the starting point is different in these approaches and also considering 
their different denominations (post-national, beyond the state, global and cosmopolitan), 
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism as a normative approach has minimal characteristics: (i) 
it is presented as a transformative and critical project, (ii) it puts rights, democracy and the 
rule of law in a central role, (iii) it uses conceptual and pragmatic arguments, and (iv) it is 
an heir of legal pacificism.
(i) Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism: a transformative and critical project. The 
characterization of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism as a project is described by Peters 
in the following terms: “I employ the term ‘global [cosmopolitan] (or inter-national) 
constitutionalism’ in order to characterize a strand of thought (an outlook or perspective) 
and a political agenda which advocate the application of constitutional principles, such 
as the rule of law, checks and balances, human rights protection, and democracy, in 
the international legal sphere in order to improve the effectivity and the fairness of the 
international legal order” (Peters, 2006: 583)”.13
13 Kumm also defines it as “a normatively ambitious project of establishing legitimate authority among free 
and equals” (Kumm, 2013: 609).
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It is a transformative project because, contrary to the traditional prejudice against 
this concept (Zolo, 2005), it does not use the “domestic analogy” as a strategy. Instead, 
it seeks to develop new criteria to comprehend the creation and legitimacy of law in 
the international field (Peters &Armigeon, 2009: 389). None of the proposals have 
a commitment to a global state, because the idea is not to create a global government, 
although constitutionalizing global governance (Peters, 2009a: 404). Moreover, it seeks 
to transcend the differentiation between national constitutional law and international law 
by proposing new criteria: the cosmopolitan. One example of the transformative element 
is the comprehension of democracy. It is sustained within this approach that “We the 
people” have to be understood as involving the international community (Kumm, 2013) 
and sovereignty must be comprehended as relational rather than national and state based 
(Benhabib, 2011).
The critical dimension can be understood in two ways: in one sense, in relation 
to constitutionalization, and in the other sense, concerning the critical character of the 
constitutional project. It is a critical perspective of the constitutionalization language 
because it does not rely on constitutional language without considering other special 
conditions within the international field. It is not a constitutionalism that creates self-
evident hierarchies, nor is it a constitutionalism that seeks to unify diversity because of 
the anxiety caused by the lack of unity.14 Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism sustains that 
a complete Constitution in the deepest and most legitimate sense does not exist in the 
international order, because it lacks legitimacy. Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism attempts 
to offer a response to the empty spaces within the constitutionalization discourse.
Considering these reflections, the critical potential of Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism is shown in its efforts to identify constitutional tendencies, but above 
all, through demonstrating anti-constitutional trends to remedy them (Peters, 2006: 602). 
Furthermore, the language is critical because constitutionalism has an internal perspective 
that demands that the arguments used to sustain legitimate authority be constantly revised, 
and that is why it does not have a necessary commitment to the status quo. Therefore, the 
constitutional language is an appropriate tool for critiquing the structures of international 
law, which are sustained in domination, and therefore it demands that these structures be 
reshaped in order to be considered legitimate.
(ii) Human rights, democracy and rule of law. Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is 
a composite concept, at the centre of which are prescriptions related to the central role 
of human rights, democracy and rule of law to argue about legitimate authority. These 
three elements are the foundation of the project and are named the “trinity” of global 
constitutionalism (Kumm, Lang, Tully, & Wiener, 2014). In regard to that matter, it is 
not a concept that we can describe as “formal” or “neutral”. Even when we consider that 
the concept and the foundations of human rights can be different (as we will examine 
in the Law/Morality debate), and that the conceptions about democracy can change (for 
example, deliberative or substantial), as well as the institutionalization of the relation 
14 This is the criticism that Schwöbel raises about many aspects of the global constitutionalism discourse 
(Schwöbel, 2011: 147).
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between these elements (regarding the different proposal about institutional architecture), 
it can be sustained that the main goal of the project is to achieve the application of these 
elements at the global level and this is the fundamental basis to comprehend the legitimacy 
of the model.
This implies that there is a connection between these three elements. However, it 
is not the same as the traditional constitutional design, because there are new elements or 
changes in the comprehension of the legitimacy of the model (regarding, for example, the 
comprehension of the demos or human rights understood as cosmopolitan norms). In a 
broader approximation, it is possible to establish that the relationship operates in this way:
Concerning human rights, because the cosmopolitan dimension is the foundation 
of the project, it is necessary to achieve the universal guarantee of human rights. Human 
rights are a goal and, at the same time, a requirement of the international and national 
debates. Democracy is not only a requirement and objective inside states at the national 
level, but also constitutes a goal at the global level because of the necessity of developing 
a legitimate authority. It also provides more complex demands regarding legitimacy at the 
national level (the cosmopolitan perspective adds new demands in terms of legitimacy 
to the “traditional model”). Finally, the rule of law element stresses that the strategy of 
limitation of power to achieve these objectives is legal and constitutional.
(iii) Conceptual and pragmatic arguments. Another aspect that is common in 
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is the use of conceptual and pragmatic arguments to 
justify the project. Following the line developed by Kant, whose arguments were pragmatic 
(related to cosmopolitan tendencies), and conceptual (reason- based), these approaches 
intend to develop an argument that connects these two perspectives.15 In regard to that 
matter, the practical foundations allow us to sustain that it is not a philosophical utopia: “It 
is no mere deduction from wishful thinking, but induced by manifold general developments 
in international law” (Peters, 2006: 605). From a conceptual perspective, it is sustained 
that there exists a conceptual connection between constitutionalism and cosmopolitanism 
considering the expansive force of constitutionalism, its historical character, and the 
current cosmopolitan turn of constitutional legitimacy.
The first element highlights that constitutionalism has an expansive force because 
it is founded on universal rights. This implies that constitutionalism must be transformed 
in order to fulfil its promises by adapting its features, considering the historical 
conditions. If constitutionalism wants to be effective, stay in time, and be coherent with 
its pretensions of universality, it must be a cosmopolitan project (Ansuátegui, 2008: 74). 
From a historical perspective, the scholarship argues that the connection between these 
approaches allows for recovering the inspiration of the French and American revolutions 
(Kumm, 2013: 611; Kumm, 2009: 315; Benhabib, 2016: 134-137). Finally, it is sustained 
that the idea of “We the people” involves an egalitarian promise of self-government that, 
15 Following Diggelman and Altwicker’s reflections on their classifications of the justification strategies of 
global constitutionalism, here we are discussing the strategies that they called “ethic-pragmatic” (Diggelman 
& Altwicker, 2008: 639).
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in the current globalization conditions, needs to have a cosmopolitan turn (Kumm, 2013; 
2009). By connecting these two concepts, it is sustained that “the constitutional legitimacy 
of national law depends, in part, on being adequately integrated into an appropriately 
structured international legal system. And the legitimacy of the international legal system 
depends, in part, on states having an adequate constitutional structure” (Kumm, 2013, 
p. 612).
(iv)	 Heir	of	legal	pacificism.	Finally, as a characteristic, it is important to highlight 
the connection between Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism and legal pacificism (scholars as 
Kant, Bobbio, Kelsen) (Habermas, 2006; Ferrajoli, 2011). Despite the differences regarding 
the objective of the project (not only peace but also human rights), the philosophical 
foundations of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism lead us to Kant and his reflections on 
cosmopolitan law, and through the path that was then developed by Kelsen and Bobbio. 
This is an important characteristic because it allows us to situate this project far away from 
sociological or moral perspectives. Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is, above all, a legal 
project.
3.  legal phIlosophy and challenges from the perspectIve of 
cosmopolItan constItutIonalIsm
When we analyse the practical possibilities of the project, we are confronted with 
a variety of problems regarding, among others, the characteristics of Law in globalization. 
To give an account of the possibilities of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, I propose 
analysing whether this is a plausible proposal considering the distinctive features of Law 
in the transnational sphere.
Constitutionalism, as a political project, was built having as a frame of reference 
a theory of Law and democracy based on the state as the central political unit. However, 
the characteristics of the transnational landscape require these concepts to be adapted 
or revisited. One of the major challenges that this kind of theory must confront is to be 
developed with a robust legal philosophical reflection. As Danilo Solo points out, these 
theories are arrived at without any substantial political or legal philosophical reflection, 
and are not comparable with the effort that was shown in the philosophical reflections 
in the development of the modern and liberal state (Zolo, 2005). So, a discourse such as 
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism has to reflect on whether it theses has to be accompanied 
by re-formulations of the classic debates of legal philosophy.
A productive path to follow regarding these issues is to analyse three major debates 
of legal philosophy:
i) Law and Morality. The tension between morality and Law is critical in this context 
because Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is a concept based on the universality of human 
rights, which is an affirmation in which its content has a robust axiological commitment. 
So, the question raised is whether it is possible to have a legal cosmopolitanism divorced 
from morality in the context of the reflections on legal philosophy.
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ii) Law and Power. The traditional debate about the relation of Law and power in 
the international sphere has been represented by the dispute between realists and legal 
pacifists. This debate has to be updated, since the power that has to be regulated by the 
cosmopolitan project is wild and diffuse and is no longer held by sovereign states. So, we 
can ask whether it possible within the cosmopolitan project to design a model that is able 
to coordinate and regulate power with these characteristics.
iii) Law and Unity. In recent years, pluralism has arisen as a third alternative in 
the traditional debate between monism and dualism. In the light of Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism, it is necessary to revisit the terms of this debate to ask which perspective 
is adequate for developing a cosmopolitan comprehension of Law. A relevant question is: 
Is it possible to develop a cosmopolitan understanding of the rule of recognition?
The analysis of all of these elements leads us to ask ourselves whether what we 
need is to develop a legal philosophy built from a transnational perspective; a philosophy 
of law that transcends the dichotomy between the international and national orders 
and that comprehends the law as a phenomenon that also occurs in the interaction 
between the different legal systems (Turégano, 2017: 226). A perspective such as this 
one, as a first approximation, is an interesting approach that provides Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism with a solid foundation from the perspective of the philosophy 
of law.
3.1. Law and Morality
From the perspective of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, if we want to enter into 
the law and morality debate, we must first determine which aspects or dimensions of the 
discussion have an impact on, or are relevant to Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism. It is a 
political project based on rights, which are norms with a strong axiological commitment 
(values such as liberty, equality, and solidarity), and considering this content and the 
language that is used to talk about rights, this leads us to pay attention to their moral 
characteristics (Mazzarese, 2004: 664-665). Also, in Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, the 
universality of human rights norms is central. This is the idea that values associated with 
rights belong to all of humanity as a minimum and without exception.
Therefore, the axiological commitment and universality put the law and 
morality debate within the field of human rights. As a result, this debate in the context 
of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is not so much related to the classic debates of the 
philosophy of law (natural law and positivism) or moral philosophy (theories of justice). 
This is because the legal norms evidence moral values, which are the foundation of human 
rights, and this is one of the fields where the intersection between law and morality is 
produced (Ansuátegui, 2013: 256-257).
So, to talk about the influence of this debate in our field leads us to highlight 
that the dimensions of these two normative orders (law and morality) are related to the 
foundations of human rights. In this context, there are difficult questions that Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism must respond to in order to be a coherent project. For example, in the 
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context of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, we must ask whether we need to have either a 
commitment to moral universalism (and if we do, in which way are we to understand it?), 
or on the contrary, a commitment in which it is only possible to talk about universality 
in legal terms (and again, if so, in which way are we to understand legal universality?). 
Putting these perspectives in dialogue highlights that there has to be a comprehension of 
human rights and universality, framing the Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism discourse.
(a) Habermas and the Janus face of human rights
To Habermas, law is a mediation platform (hinge) between the pretensions of 
validity within the morality discourse and the facticity of the political discourse (Habermas, 
1996). There does not exist any relation of superiority between the political, legal, and 
moral planes. The three are related and connected through the law, and share as a basis 
the communicative reason which operates through the discourse principle. From this 
perspective, when Habermas analyses the relations between law and morality, we must 
be aware that they have a complementary relationship. He sustains that law and morality 
have a relationship that does not imply an assumption of the natural law, because morality 
is not above the law (as the natural law suggests); instead it migrates inside the law.16
Within this comprehension, it is possible to have a better understating of his 
concept of human rights and the ideas about law and morality related to his understanding 
of universality. Even though Habermas develops the majority of his reflections having as 
a frame of reference constitutional democracies, in recent years his reflections have been 
oriented towards the analysis of rights beyond the state.
Habermas’ concept of human rights makes it clear that within the concept, the 
relation between law and morality is present because, as he says, human rights are like 
“the face of Janus”, because they look at the same time to law and morality. For that 
matter, human rights have two dimensions. The hinge between law and morality within 
the human rights concept is human dignity: “The idea of human dignity is the conceptual 
hinge that connects the morality of equal respect for everyone with positive law and 
democratic lawmaking in such a way that their interplay could give rise to a political order 
founded upon human rights” (Habermas, 2010: 269).
Human dignity has a revealing function because historical experience continually 
shows us different violations of human dignity, and that allows us to see new traits emerging 
that actualize our comprehension of human dignity. This leads us to the construction 
of new fundamental rights or new interpretations of their content. These references to 
human dignity, however, differ from the rationalistic-natural law tradition (in which the 
foundations of human dignity are a pre-political conception of human nature), because 
they do not present human dignity as an immanent reality.
16 Law has a certain amount of autonomy because the pretensions of validity within discourse theory are not 
exclusively related to morality, because within the law there are also pragmatic reasons. Also, we can see 
these differences from a functional perspective because law complements morality in respect to personal 
conflicts, but also has a dimension that is related to the organization of political power (Velasco, 2000: 99).
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The moral character of human rights allows us to justify their expansive force, 
and that is why their validity transcends the national legal orders. The expansive force of 
human rights is founded neither on their legal form, nor from a justificatory strategy based 
on the reality of the codependence of global society (as the pragmatic or political strategies 
would do, such as, for example, Ferrajoli). Instead, Habermas bases the expansion on 
morality (human dignity): “Finally, the origin of human rights in the moral notion of 
human dignity explains the explosive political force of a concrete utopia” (Habermas, 
2010: 466).
However, the universality is not only justified because of the expansive force of 
the morality discourse based on human dignity, it is also justified because of the basis of 
Habermas’ concept of human rights: the discourse principle. This is a principle that can 
operate in any political community that has as an aspiration legitimacy under the law, and 
it can be national, regional or global (Flynn, 2003: 454).
If human rights are conditional upon the exercise of communicative freedom and 
participation in self-determination discourses, considerations such as nationality, religion, 
ethnicity and race are not valid reasons to deny participation in these discourses. The 
rational-impartial reasoning principle which is the basis of moral cosmopolitanism, in 
Habermas’ case, is shown in the requirement for the participation of all people in the public 
sphere and in the development of a cosmopolitan order that allows that kind of dialogue.
(b) Ferrajoli and legal positivist relativism
Unlike Habermas, for Ferrajoli universality in the context of Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism can only be understood in legal terms. This is explained by his concept 
of fundamental rights and his ethical positions. Ferrajoli has a formal definition of 
fundamental rights. It means that he considers fundamental rights as the rights that belong 
to all people, understanding “right” as a “subjective right” (an expectation attached to 
a legal norm) (Ferrajoli, 2009: 19). The characterization of this concept as a “formal” 
concept means that the concept does not describe the content of rights or prescribe 
their content; instead, it seeks only to describe what fundamental rights are (Ferrajoli, 
2011: 685).
Even though Ferrajoli has a formal concept of fundamental rights, that does not 
imply that he ignores the fact that fundamental rights are a product of political and moral 
developments. It only means that he recognizes that the transformation of political and 
moral demands into legal norms does not indicate that they are accepted by all and does 
not impose their moral acceptance or the sharing of their values (Ferrajoli, 2011: 14). That 
is why he provides a fundamental rights concept that allows us to understand it with no 
moral reference to identify it.
Considering these reflections, for Ferrajoli to say that the human rights doctrine 
should be assumed universally in moral terms is an anti-liberal thesis. It is precisely 
because not everyone morally shares human rights that they are stipulated as guaranteed 
to all. This is the true sense in which we have to understand universality. The foundations 
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of fundamental rights can be found in the equality that they prescribe; not because they 
are shared by all, but instead because they are guaranteed to all (Ferrajoli, 2011: 549). 
Another element that allows us to understand the universality concept in Ferrajoli’s ideas 
is his relativist position regarding morality. Ferrajoli raises the idea that this is a meta-
ethics and epistemology question, which is at the base of the debate regarding law and 
morality. His position implies that the truth or falsehood of moral affirmations cannot be 
established with absolute certainty, and that is why he states that his position is the only 
one that is compatible with tolerance.
(c) Legal cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism, separate paths?
When Walker analyses Habermas’s cosmopolitan proposal, he sustains that 
cosmopolitans are often confronted by serious tensions that are illustrated by the difficulty 
in reconciling the relationships between the institutional, moral, and social dimensions 
of cosmopolitanism (Walker, 2005: 5). These tensions are manifested by the difficulty 
in defending universal moral aspirations considering cultural diversity, and how to 
institutionalize universality through legal structures that have as an objective to be efficient 
in regard to the cosmopolitan aspirations. Through the analysis of these cosmopolitan 
proposals and how they propose to articulate the different dimensions, it is possible to see 
the roots of the problems.
Considering the struggle of reconciling the different dimensions, we have in the 
contemporary debate different options. Some have renounced the efforts of reconciliation 
and justification and only use the cosmopolitan language to impose their values unilaterally 
(the false cosmopolitanism of the US “Pax Americana”). Others do not attempt ambitious 
projects from the justificatory point of view. Instead, they offer limited conceptions 
about human rights (the pragmatics, such as (Ignatieff, 2001)). Finally, others have as an 
option disregarded the morality in the justificatory discourse to present alternatives that 
are compatible with the neutrality demanded by cultural diversity (like Ferrajoli). So the 
tensions that all cosmopolitans have to face are present in the answers that Ferrajoli and 
Habermas provide.
Concerning Ferrajoli’s arguments, it is possible to sustain that the construction 
of a model so exigent as Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is, it cannot be separated 
from moral universalism (Benhabib, 2011:64). If we do not recognize at least the 
communicative freedom of the other, the justificatory mission has no meaning. That is 
why the utilitarianism of Ferrajoli is insufficient as a basis for a cosmopolitan proposal. To 
be coherent, these proposals require a kind of minimal objectivism. This means that it has 
to assume a comprehension of equality and reciprocity, which allows us to design a model 
based on rights. Even if we assume the utilitarian strategy as a basis for Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism it is because, as a minimum, we consider that there is something 
valuable to preserve under certain prescriptions.17 The discourse cannot escape from the 
difficulties raised when we interpret the basis of universality in moral terms.
17 As Ansuátegui points out, the rights discourse is a discourse that has the individual as a central protagonist. 
His value is presupposed not because of his belonging to a specific group, ethnic group, ideology or 
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For that reason, Habermas’ perspective is more adequate. The way that these 
arguments are presented in justificatory terms in his comprehension of Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism highlights that moral universalism is required and implies, as a 
minimum, the recognition of communicative freedom (that in Habermas’s perspective 
historically is assumed to be dignity). This concept is also developed by authors such as 
Benhabib and Forst, under different titles such as “the right to have rights”18 and the “basic 
right of justification”.19
We can characterize the nucleus of these conceptions as constructivist (based on 
the discourse ethics), which sustains as a basic principle that there is a right to accept 
or reject the reasons presented by the speaker, and implies respect for communicative 
freedom.20 Whether by the “right to have rights” or by the “basic right of justification” 
formula, they are both expressions of minimal moral objectivism. It is objective because 
it presupposes the existence of criteria that allow us to debate by using reasons and 
determine the correctness of the arguments. It is minimally objectivist when it is applied 
to our debate because the shape that the rights might take is determined discursively by 
the affected; it is not implied that it is the better or superior version of a concrete moral 
theory (Baynes, 2009: 18).
This minimal objectivism does not imply moral absolutism (as Ferrajoli sustains); 
it only entails that “any legal and political justification of human rights, that is, the project 
of legal universalism, presupposes recourse to justificatory universalism. The task of 
justification, in turn, cannot proceed without the acknowledgment of the communicative 
freedom of the other” (Benhabib, 2011: 64).
A perspective such as this one has different advantages:
(i) It is based on minimal objectivism, so moral development and the recognition of 
the historical dimension of human dignity are central ideas. Therefore, universalism is 
not based on the deep structure of the psyche or mind; instead, it is based on historical 
and moral experiences. There is a deep normative perspective in the history of the 
struggle for rights and such a normative perspective is related to the basic idea that people 
have the right to give and demand reasons (Forst, 2010: 719). The existence of this 
normative account allows us to sustain that rights cannot be used to defend indiscriminate 
pretensions.
religion, but instead because of his moral value and his demand to be recognized by others (Ansuátegui, 
2013b: 112).
18 The author actualizes Arendt’s (1973) concept, but here it has a different meaning (not statist) (Benhabib, 
2011).
19 In Fost’s version, this right is not associated with any specific metaphysical conception of human nature; 
instead it is a fundamental moral demand that no culture or society can deny. It is the unconditioned demand 
to be respected as someone to whom reasons about actions, rules, or structures should be provided (Forst, 
2010).
20 Habermas’ and also Forst and Benbabib’s perspectives are similar but present some subtle differences. 
However, they all have related and common aspects that allow us to characterize these positions as a shared 
view. A comparison between these three authors can be found in Baynes (2009).
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(ii) A conception like this one does not have a detailed list of what rights should be listed 
to protect communicative freedom. It is “justificatory minimalism”, not a minimalism of 
contents (Cohen: 2004, 192). A justificatory minimalism allows us to sustain that, within 
the context of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, there are certain decisions that cannot 
be justified or some limits that we cannot cross. However, this is not an excuse to state 
that we cannot arrive at greater agreements in the international plane through democratic 
dialogue, social demands and contextualization.
(iii) This perspective does not imply the use of positivism or natural law as explicative 
paradigms. The universality of human rights as the basis for the cosmopolitan perspective 
incorporates the inherent tension between law and morality, and that is why it transcends 
this division (Forst, 1999, 49). This minimal objectivism does not indicate a commitment 
to natural law because there does not exist a commitment to transcendental truth that is 
above the law. It only recognizes that there are certain matters that we can discuss rationally 
and regarding which we can argue about their correctness (or not) if the conditions of the 
discourse are fulfilled. It admits that, within this debate, there is a tension with human 
rights produced by their pretensions of validity, which transcend the context and their 
specificities. However, it is a tension that can be relieved when we sustain that there is a 
relation of codependence between the human rights concept and democracy.
(iv) Finally, this perspective is compatible with the demands of cultural integrity 
because no culture can deny this minimum as an external imposition. As Forst sustains, 
the demands of cultural integrity presuppose the affirmation of the existence of the right 
to justification (Forst, 1999: 39).
So, if we return to the questions raised in this debate, it is possible to sustain that 
legal cosmopolitanism cannot be separated from a cosmopolitan moral perspective, even 
though it is minimal. This affirmation concerning the classic debates of legal philosophy 
suggests that we have to rethink the division between law and morality in absolute 
terms, because if we recognize that human rights are at the centre of the cosmopolitan 
proposal, then this indicates an assumption that there is an inherent tension within the 
project. Therefore, the objective of legal philosophy should not be to deny the tension or 
to overlap one dimension with the other. Instead, it must recognize the tension, value it, 
and above all, try to negotiate the interdependence between these two dimensions through 
the application of the universal in concrete cultural contexts.
3.2. Law and Power
Another aspect that is relevant to the debates about the philosophy of law, and 
particularly constitutionalism, is the relations between law and power. This is a central 
aspect of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism because this is a proposal about how to articulate 
this relationship beyond the state.
This debate applied to the international field was framed for many years by the 
dispute between legal pacifists and realists, and today it is concerned with the criticism of 
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the capacity of treaties to bind and guide state conduct regarding human rights obligations.21 
However, from the constitutional and cosmopolitan perspective there emerges an additional 
debate. The power that is supposed to be regulated and coordinated with the law differs 
from the power that was the subject of study by traditional theory. It is no longer a power 
centred on the state, and it is not only political power. It is a diffuse power and it is also 
concentrated in big corporations and characterized as a “wild” power.22
So, in this context, it is important to ask ourselves how this power configuration 
affects the philosophy of law (in general) and constitutionalism (in particular). If 
constitutionalism is a legal strategy to put limits on power, it is necessary to determine 
which power we are referring to when the debate is situated beyond state margins, and 
how we identify such power and limit it. As we will see in the following part, even 
though there are a variety of answers, there is a standard or shared view regarding the 
characterization of power and the problems related to it in the context of globalization. 
These characteristics are:1) it is shared power, 2) it is diffuse and wild, and 3) it is affected 
by an inverse hierarchy.
(i) Our first topic highlights the existence of a transfer or loss of power from the states 
to supra-national spheres. The states are no longer the centre of normative productions, 
nor are they the centre of political decisions (Twining, 2005). Sometimes, this process is 
produced in an ordered way (such as the assignment of sovereignty by the state, which is 
produced by the political organization in supra-national spheres through treaties), and in 
other cases, it is part of a non-regulated or non-systematic process of sovereignty loss (for 
example, the movement of political and governmental functions to the market).
(ii) The second topic emphasizes the diffuse character of power. In contrast to the classic 
constitutional model, which identifies power with political power, in the globalization 
context, there is a mixture of public and private power that is not easily recognizable and 
is also not susceptible to accountability. Habermas also points out that we can see the 
power blurred in a variety of communication and negotiation channels in spaces such 
as the G-20 or the G-8 (Habermas, 2015: 51). It is also a wild power because it has 
an absolute sovereignty, and it is impersonal, anonymous, invisible, and not responsible 
(Ferrajoli, 2018a: 18).
(iii) Finally, the last element that describes power beyond the state is predominantly 
its economic shape. As Ferrajoli points out, we are in front of an inverse hierarchy of 
power, because now it is no longer the governmental institutions that order the economy 
and financial capital; instead, it is the economic and financial power that imposes on 
governments the defence of their interests and their rules (Ferrajoli, 2018a: 19)
21 In the contemporary debate, the positions of Posner (2014) and Simmons (2009; 2012) are relevant. 
The principal topic is based on how effective the system is at limiting power and the law’s capacity to be 
coercive beyond the state. Regarding coercion, it is interesting to see the “outcasting” proposal developed 
by Hathaway and Shapiro (2011).
22 The expression “wild power” refers to the unrestricted liberty and lawlessness that Kant describes, a 
power that is not subject to limits and rules, a power that is characteristic of the natural state because of the 
lack of legal limits. This expression is used in the context of our debate by Ferrajoli (2011:45).
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Koskenniemi describes the effects of this shape of power on law, by indicating 
that it has three main consequences: “deformalization” (the law is developed functionally 
following experts directives), “fragmentation” (it is no longer unified, and there is 
normative dispersion), and “empire” (the law is developed in relation to the dominant 
interest, which is now economics). When these characteristics of law are expressed in the 
language of power, we can see that we are abandoning the language of law by “regulation”, 
the government by “governance”, and responsibility by “compliance” (Koskenniemi, 
2007a: 13-14).23
From the constitutional perspective, we are alerted to the necessity to discard the 
view that the state is the only agent respect of which the constitutional project can fulfill 
its promises. In fact, the constitutional project can no longer keep its goals if it does not 
change its comprehension of power. To use the territoriality principle to determine its 
frame would now be unjust. To divide the political space along territorial lines would 
indicate that we renounce to the necessity for accountability from extra-territorial powers 
(Fraser, 2008: 12-47). To abandon the constitutional limits is not only a danger to law, it 
is also a threat to freedom and the survival of democracy.
Considering this analysis, the cosmopolitan perspective proposes that, within 
the globalization context, it is necessary to transform the concept of power towards a 
comprehension that allows for talking about control. That is why we have to work it in 
a broader sense. We need to understand power as the expression of domination, which 
implies a danger to freedom, and also that power can operate under, beyond and parallel 
to the state.
However, the underlying problem for the philosophy of law that this characterization 
of power implies is an abdication to globalization. The theory has incorporated globalization 
as a natural phenomenon. Legal theory has accepted globalization as prescriptive,24 and 
from this perspective, the efforts have been focused on the comprehension of soft-law and 
the fragmentation phenomenon (Klabbers, 2009b:94). The problem is that this analysis 
does not criticize globalization from the philosophy of law perspective, and it does not 
ask whether these concepts and phenomena suppose a threat to the rule of law25 and 
democracy.26
This tension between the descriptive and the prescriptive elements can lead us to 
the classical division that Koskenniemi highlighted in his book, “From apology to utopia” 
(Koskenniemi, 2005). He analyses the structure of the legal arguments, stressing that 
23 This phenomenon is also characterized by Koskenniemi as an example of the “fate” of international 
law because of the relevance of other normative orders that are competing with and replacing the law: see 
Koskenniemi (2007b).
24 As Fariñas points out, globalization is, above all, a descriptive concept about certain historical developments 
of social construction. As a prescriptive and normative concept, it refers to a certain political and economic 
strategy (Fariñas, 2012: 112-113).
25 For problems related to soft law and rule of law, see the criticism of Laporta (2014: 41-82) and Klabbers 
(2009b).
26 Peters raises issues about transparency and accountability that are related to soft-law (Peters, 2006: 593).
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within the international debate, we can find two positions: an apology to power (which is 
descriptive of the various relations of power and politics), and prescriptive discourses that 
lack normative effectivity (utopia). Between these two arguments we can find a variety of 
academic positions.
Even though Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is an heir of the second approach 
of this dualism (because it is an heir of legal pacifism), it also considers the reality of 
the international sphere, which incorporates international treaties, international courts 
and the complex normative structure that operates as a foundation of its arguments. That 
is why Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism defines itself as a “realistic utopia”. On this 
point Ferrajoli adds further detail. He highlights that the real opposition is not between 
realism and utopias, but between realism in the short and long terms. The truly unrealistic 
hypothesis is to think that reality, as it is now (without limits and wild), can be sustained. 
He argues that there are no alternatives to law (Ferrajoli, 2011: 585).
So, the constitutional perspective attempts to claim the critical dimension of the 
philosophy of law by studying the problems we have described with a critical approach. 
By confronting the surrender of the theory, scholars like Habermas and Ferrajoli propose 
different strategic attempts to put legal limits on this wild power.
For Ferrajoli, the strategy is based on expanding the concept of power as demanded 
by the constitutional project. It does this by proposing a “private law constitutionalism”. 
To argue for this concept, he presents two assertions: a) the formal character of the 
constitutional paradigm, and b) a critique of the traditional concepts of rights and 
power.
Ferrajoli can talk about the expansion of the constitutional paradigm for private 
power because he sustains that this paradigm is formal and has a logical syntax27 that can 
be fulfilled with any content and expanded to any power: not only public but also private, 
and not only based on the state, but also beyond it (Ferrajoli, 2018a: 27).
The author also argues that it is possible to expand the paradigm of power if we 
demystify some concepts from classical liberalism that are guilty of lacking legal limits on 
private power. He argues that there has been confusion when we identify “rights-freedom” 
with “rights-power”. The first is related to the exercise of autonomy and the second relates 
to powers related to property. If “rights-power” is exercised by acts that produce effects 
on the legal sphere of others, then they are structurally different to “rights-freedom”. So, 
if “rights-power” is the exercise of power, then it has to be subjected to limits (Ferrajoli, 
2018a: 35-36).
These two arguments allow Ferrajoli to propose a private law constitutionalism and 
also to sustain the importance of putting limits on financial and transnational corporate 
powers, which are a threat to rights and freedom.
27 For more on the logical form of the constitutional paradigm in Ferrajoli’s approach, see Ferrajoli (2018b).
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For Habermas, the rule of law has been a civilizing conquest in relation to power 
because it controls the arbitrariness and violence of political domination. A continuation 
of this process can be identified in the legal form of international relations. From the 
power perspective, this has produced a “dissolution of the decisionistic substance of the 
power involved in the exercise of political authority”, and from the perspective of law, it 
has produced a “transformation of the medium of law” (Habermas, 2015: 52). That is why, 
for Habermas, in contrast to Ferrajoli, we are not only facing a change in the relations 
between public and private power, we are also facing new ways of exercising public 
power. This has implied a change in the elements of modern law (Habermas, 2015: 52).
These elements are legitimacy and coercion. In the international field and in the 
European Union, it has been shown that power changing has generated an imbalance of 
these two elements. The law is applied even when states maintain a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force. There has been a recognition of the validity of law without coercion. 
For Habermas, this phenomenon implies an admission of a flexible comprehension of law 
(Habermas, 2015: 54).
The centre of the problem has to be focused on analysing how the concept of 
law has changed due to changes to power. So, it is not sufficient to only reflect on the 
application of the constitutional paradigm and its expansion. For Habermas, these kinds 
of reflections cannot be separated from a deeper analysis of the legitimacy of norms that 
put limits on power.
In fact, if constitutionalism is above all a project about the legitimacy of power 
and we want to use the language of constitutionalism, we cannot dismiss within the 
analysis the questions regarding why the norms are followed and the legitimacy of the 
norms themselves (Habermas, 2015: 55). What we have seen in the international field 
is a rationalization of domination, but the rule of law, as a civilizing conquest, is also 
to act through the law, which implies that the law is democratic (Habermas, 2015: 55). 
These reflections put Habermas’ perspective within the context of the debates in political 
philosophy, where he proposes that the elements of the discourse theory have to be used 
to analyse the democratic deficit of international organizations (it is a discourse about 
transnational democracy)(Habermas, 2008).
Both perspectives are diverse; however they both make a strong defence regarding 
the significance of law in the international sphere, and they both develop a critical 
perspective towards globalization. They are not conflicting outlooks, and both highlight 
essential elements that allow us to redefine the relationship between law and power in 
cosmopolitan terms. Both perspectives also alert us about the necessity of extending our 
concept of power and analyse how the elements of law are being transformed. Considering 
these reflections, we can establish that the principal challenge to the philosophy of law is 
overcoming the divergence that exists when we analyse the expansion of global power, 
and compare that expansion with law (this reflection is still based on a state-level). The 
divergence causes a threat to the survival of law.
In fact, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is a project that attempts to recover the 
historical objective of constitutionalism as a legal project (realization of the autonomy 
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principle), by giving it particular significance in our historical context: the generation of 
spaces of freedom and equality for those that cannot enjoy freedom and equality, because 
currently their conditions of life are not dependent on the state that they live in, but instead 
they depend on the political and economic forces beyond the state. If we put our hope 
in other alternatives rather than the Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism model, we deprive 
individuals of the capacity of being autonomous citizens. If we renounce constitutionalism 
in the international sphere, we abandon individuals into an incontrollable future of 
anonymous networks of power (Habermas, 1998: 124).
The important lesson that we learn is that overcoming the divergence cannot be 
unlinked (if we use the constitutional perspective) from answers about the “how”, the 
“who” and the “what” in the international sphere (Fraser, 2008:15). As La Torre28 points 
out, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism requires satisfying two demands: the generation of 
a global civil society with participation in the global public sphere, and the provision 
of elements that explain the practice of international organizations and law from the 
transnational perspective (La Torre, 2016: 10).
3.3. Law and unity
Finally, there is a third debate that has occupied the philosophy of law, and that, 
within the context of our argument, has to be revisited. Traditionally it is sustained, 
concerning the legal order, its unity and coherence as characteristics. However, the 
transformations of power and law have as a consequence the co-existence of multiple 
legalities: national, supranational, international and cosmopolitan. That is why it has been 
sustained that the current scenario is characterized, among others, by fragmentation.29 
Within this context, it is critical to ask whether it is possible to still talk about the law 
in terms of unity. Is it compatible with a constitutional approach such as a fragmented 
scenario? Is Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism capable of explaining and incorporating this 
reality?
Over the past decades, two paradigms have emerged to explain the relationship 
between different legal orders within the philosophy of international law: monism 
and dualism.30 Recently, considering the fragmentation scenario, a third approach has 
emerged: pluralism.31 Within this context, we will analyse whether monism, dualism or 
pluralism are sufficient to explain law dynamics beyond the state that have constitutional 
characteristics. A plausible answer to these problems would give the Cosmopolitan 
28 However it is important to highlight that he is sceptical about the possibility.
29 For more on the fragmentation of international law see Koskenniemi’s report for the International Law 
Commission in 2006 (Koskenniemi, 2006). For an analysis of  the current changes in law due to globalization 
see Catá Backer (2012) and Twining (2005).
30 Historically, monism has been associated with the positions of Kelsen, Verdross, Lauterpach and dualism 
with Triepel and Anzilotti.
31 Pluralism is associated with different concepts and scholars. A general picture about the different 
interpretations of this concept can be found in the research of Avbelj y Komárek (2012) and Schiff Berman 
(2016).
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Constitutionalism project sufficient tools to be emancipated from strong pluralism and 
state-based perspectives regarding law (Turégano: 2017, 225).
A first matter is to dismiss dualism as a possibility because its theoretical basis is 
incompatible with the cosmopolitan paradigm, and also it is not an adequate description of 
the functioning of an international legal system. Contemporarily, dualism has incorporated 
the shape of democratic statism (Kumm, 2012: 47-54). For this approach only within 
the state can we find the conditions to generate valid norms and that is why only the 
state can determine the application of norms that belong to other legal orders (so, it can 
be sustained that within the democratic turn dualism has become statist monism).32 This 
affirmation is problematic for the cosmopolitan discourse because it does not recognize 
sovereignty as a shared enterprise that has as a basis the universality of human rights. 
Additionally, this perspective is not sufficient to explain the current interaction between 
international, national and cosmopolitan norms. These spheres of legality do not work in 
isolation; they interact with and complement each other. The recognition of the existence 
of different sources of legality does not mean that we can ignore the fact that these norms 
are related. So, from the perspective of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, we still have 
two possibilities: monism and pluralism. These positions are sustained by Habermas and 
Ferrajoli, respectively.
In Ferrajoli’s approach, this explanation is based on a polycentric view of law. He 
emphasizes that considering the current legality, it is possible to establish the existence 
of a pluralism, understanding it as a complex and diverse network of different legalities 
and legal institutions within which there are different scales of integration (Ferrajoli, 
2011: 475). It is not a radical pluralism (as, for example, (Krisch, 2011)), because in his 
approach the different legal orders are integrated in diverse kinds of federalism. That is 
why, for Ferrajoli, neither monism nor dualism has enough force to explain the current 
developments of international law. The figure that appropriately explains the shape of 
legality is a grid (Ferrajoli, 2011: 474).33 Within this context the question emerges of 
how Ferrajoli tries to make this vision of law compatible and at the same time sustain 
a constitutional paradigm. He sustains that it is possible because we must reserve the 
constitution as an autonomous and supra ordered space, which implies, for example, the 
use of the better protection principle of human rights as an adequate principle to give 
coherence and unity to the system (Ferrajoli, 2011: 541).
In Habermas’ perspective, we find an attempt to explain the functioning of norms 
through the analysis of the movement of the different elements of law. The movement 
is towards a recognition of the legitimacy of the authority in the supranational sphere, 
even when states maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Considering this 
32 Kumm points out that “As liberal constitutional democracies were increasingly constrained perhaps not 
by a weberian iron cage but at least a strong web of transnational legal norms, statism took a democratic 
turn: now the divide between national law and international law was justified with reference to democratic 
constitutional theory” (Kumm, 2011: 48).
33 It is common in the literature to find a description of the global landscape as a “net” or “grid” (Losano, 
2005), which dismisses the traditional “pyramid” image of the legal world.
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movement, Habermas argues that there is a tendency to equate the value of national and 
international law. This is an approach towards a monist conception of law (albeit at a 
snail’s pace), as Kelsen has proposed (Habermas, 2015: 54).
Both perspectives generate doubts and have been questioned. These doubts must 
move us to reflect on which is the better description for the scenario and also, from a 
normative perspective, which approach provides clear criteria to resolve the problems of 
interaction.
There are scholars who argue that constitutionalism cannot be separated from a 
monist perspective. They sustain that it is not possible to defend constitutional supremacy 
and rigidity without defending the idea of a legal order that is unified and hierarchical 
(Somek, 2012; Puppo, 2015) and that is why Ferrajoli’s pluralism is inconsistent with 
a constitutional approach. Additionally Ferrajoli’s pluralism is limited to the factual 
verification of the diversity of legalities and does not provide normative criteria to resolve 
conflicts that allow us to decide what to do when we are faced with multiple “deciding 
spheres” (except for the vague idea of the better protection principle) (Bayón, 2013). For 
that matter, his perspective does not bring any new elements to the philosophy of law in 
this specific regard because his pluralism does not provide a legal and normative response 
to interconnection.
Also, monism does not explain the reality of interaction appropriately and offers 
a static view of the claims of legal authority. The transnational sphere is characterized 
as having within it a complex network of authority claims (Roughan, 2013; Turégano, 
2017: 226). Additionally, a monist perspective does not allow for an effective dialogue 
between the different claims because it endorses a legal hegemony that is incompatible 
with a cosmopolitan perspective. Moreover, the static view based on hierarchy leaves out 
the fact that within the cosmopolitan constitutional perspective, other criteria should be 
considered, for example, the effectiveness of human rights protection. A good example of 
the problems involved in a response based solely on hierarchy as a criteria can be seen in 
the “Kadi Case”.34
Finally, both perspectives miss the importance of considering the way in 
which cosmopolitan norms are created. Cosmopolitan norms are norms produced by 
the interaction of a variety of legal authorities (norms that are framed by national and 
international contents). Their cosmopolitan nature emerges in the overlapping, in the 
complexity of the interaction. Truly cosmopolitan is what is produced by the relation 
between different authority claims, implying a construction of norms with a complex 
content that flows over the borders.35 However, both Habermas and Ferrajoli are still 
34 ECJ. judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008.Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.
35 A similar version of this proposal is sustained by Benhabib using the concept “democratic iterations” 
to describe the way that human rights norms are built in different cultural contexts. From her perspective, 
human rights norms have a nucleus that is being continuously fulfilled with different legal sources (national 
and supranational). In this way norms are emerging with complex content (Benhabib, 2011). Another account 
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focused on a vision of law where the national and international spheres are separated and, 
even when they describe the interaction, they do not explain the complexity of the legal 
reality (they still are in the “black box model” of legality),36 which involves above all legal 
porosity understood as legal interaction (Brunnée, 2010). Therefore, from the perspective 
of the philosophy of law, it is necessary to have a normative perspective that explains the 
reality of cosmopolitan norms and, at the same time, provides criteria to recognize such 
norms37 and for resolving conflicts between differing claims.
As Bayón points out (2013: 86-87), the real problem of constitutionalism in 
the global sphere is that there are relations between overlapping orders without a clear 
rule about how to achieve coordination between them. Using the terms of Hart, it is 
sustained that what we are missing is a theoretical construction of a rule of recognition 
in cosmopolitan terms. So, the question is how to build a complex rule of coherent and 
general principles about how to distribute the legitimate authority that is also based on the 
current legal practice.
This perspective assumes a constructivist vision of law that recognizes the 
existence of dialogues between legal actors in the transnational scene, which implies a 
common understanding regarding the features of law. This shared understanding is framed 
by constitutional principles (Kleinlein, 2012b). At this point, we can see that the normative 
theory and legal theory are connected because “the application and specification of valid 
law requires – especially in hard cases – normative reasoning, that is, a type of reasoning 
which is guided by those principles that confer legitimacy to the legal system as a whole” 
(Habermas, 2013b). Even though the construction of such a rule is beyond the objectives 
of this paper, we can enumerate theoretical tools that can be useful to move towards this 
objective.
Concerning the construction of cosmopolitan norms, perspectives such as “inter-
legality” and “transnational law”38 capture more completely the reality of cosmopolitan 
norms because they put value on the existence of a creative potential within the law 
that is given by the interaction between different spheres of legality that influence each 
other, that is, “the unavoidable interconnectedness of legalities” (Palombella, 2019: 
366). This perspective, in contrast to some kinds of pluralism, does not miss the internal 
point of view because it puts value on the relevance of the normative criteria that are 
responsible for sustaining the notion of legal order and incorporates a minimal and shared 
concept of law that allows the dialogue (Günther, 2008; Taekema, 2019). Inter-legality is 
of cosmopolitan norms understood as the result of interaction can be found in Neves (2017: 294), regarding 
the concept of “transversal network”, and in Walker (2008: 378), referring to “in-between places” norms.
36 The “Black-box model” conceives different levels of law as self-contained regimes (Tuori, 2015: 37).
37 Considering the “rule of law” element within the constitutional paradigm, it is important to develop 
criteria to distinguish law from non-law (Klabbers, 2009b). Also it is important regarding the internal point 
of view of legal officials (García Pascual, 2018).
38 Even though inter-legality is a concept that emerges within sociological studies and with descriptive 
purposes (Nickel, 2005), recently it has been used in legal theory with normative applications; see for example 
Turégano (2017) and the most recent book coordinated by Palombella & Klabbers (2019). Moreover, it has 
to be considered that inter-legality does not necessarily endorse a constitutional perspective.
legal phIlosophy and cosmopolItan constItutIonalIsm. debates on moralIty, unIty, and power
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 14 (June 2020) pp. 77-107  ISSN: 2340-9592 DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v14.5479 98
compatible with Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism because it includes the characteristics 
of cosmopolitan norms and it is not incompatible with developing substantive criteria 
regarding the legitimacy of law under a constitutional perspective. Moreover, it does 
not reduce complexity as monism does, but instead allows for the production of new 
institutions that will be able to include those interactions (Turégano, 2017: 236).
Although Habermas endorses monism, it is important to highlight that he claims 
that this is an initial approximation and he endorses it because he links pluralism with 
contextualism, which does not enable us to “explain how international courts with justices 
from different legal traditions ever come to agree on decisions for the same or similar 
reasons”(Habermas, 2013b). However, a possible path to follow is to make connections 
between his discourse theory and the inter-legality perspective. In fact, from Habermas’ 
perspective, it is possible to establish the conditions for participation in the discourse, 
which enables only models for the incorporation of diversity and, at the same time, remains 
open to a reflexive dialogue in relation to norms. Both elements allow for a continuous 
conversation within the law that is capable of overcoming the problems of fragmentation 
(Turégano: 2017, 258). From this point of view it is possible to design a research agenda 
with the objective of determining whether Habermas’ legal philosophy can contribute to 
the strength of the inter-legality approach.
In relation to developing and constructing criteria for a rule of recognition in 
cosmopolitan terms, the key within this context is determining which is the better 
interpretation of the relationship between the many orders, considering the demands 
of constitutionalism and legal practice (Kumm, 2005: 287; Klabbers, 2009b). At this 
point the normative perspective emerges and connects with the cosmopolitan discourse. 
Considering the elements we have described as a central part of the cosmopolitan 
discourse, it is possible to establish that -as a minimum- this complex rule implies the 
identification of procedural and substantive criteria about how legitimate authority should 
be distributed (Kumm, 2009: 272). From the procedural perspective, it will be important 
to consider the conditions of the discourse and the democratic demands, and from the 
substantive perspective it will be necessary to consider the better protection principle 
regarding human rights, among others.
If it is possible to sustain the existence of such criteria, it is possible to keep the 
promise of unity, but it must be understood as convergence within dispersion and not as 
“legal monarchy”. The existence of these criteria makes it possible to sustain coherence 
and a system as ideas within the transnational scenario. The difference is that these criteria 
are based not only on a formal hierarchy, although they are based on an interactional 
conception of the legal phenomena.
4. conclusIon
Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism is an especially demanding approach for legal 
philosophy. It requires us to redefine some traditional theses and to adapt them to the 
new features of the international scenario, without renouncing its basic commitment 
to human rights, democracy and rule of law. It calls for a substantial effort from those 
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who sustain this idea because it challenges our traditional comprehension of power, 
identification of law and its relations with morality. In the academic field, as we had seen, 
some perspectives are being developed to comprehend this reconfiguration of the global 
public sphere. However, we do not yet have a holistic answer to all of these challenges. 
That is why sometimes we do not see a coherent and profound discourse about the key 
questions that legal philosophy must achieve.
After analysing Habermas’ and Ferrajoli’s perspectives, it is possible to establish 
some elements that challenge the traditional discourse and provide us with some clues to 
reconstruct a legal philosophy from a transnational approach. Even though it is a complex, 
dynamic, and possibly inexorable task (considering the features of the legal sphere), 
the analysis highlights some minimal elements to establish the basis of a theory of this 
kind:
(i) Regarding the relations between law and morality it is possible to sustain that 
within Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, considering that this is a discourse based on 
the universality of human rights, legal cosmopolitanism cannot be unlinked from moral 
cosmopolitanism reflections if we want a coherent and potentially universal project 
(although it is a minimal perspective based on human dignity). This supposes that we 
do not have to deny the existing tension between law and morality; instead it supposes 
that we have to recognize it and develop mechanisms to negotiate the interdependence 
between these two dimensions through the application of the universal in concrete cultural 
contexts.
(ii) Additionally, we require a broader concept of power to be able to recover the 
historical vocation of constitutionalism if this project is to be applied in other spaces 
(supranational and international) and to survive in the national space. This posits the 
civilizing capacity of law in relation to power. However, as Habermas makes clear, this 
cannot be unlinked from a profound reasoning about the legitimacy of law beyond the 
state. So, at this point, legal philosophy must be connected to normative commitments.
(iii) Finally, we must reframe the concepts of unity and the coherence of the legal 
system considering the current configuration of the global normative sphere. From the 
theory of law, we must explain how cosmopolitan norms are created and developed. 
This leaves us with some challenges: to develop a perspective that is able to describe the 
legal reality and also, from a normative point of view, to provide criteria to recognize 
such norms and resolve conflicts. Inter-legality as an approach and the construction of a 
rule of recognition with substantive and procedural criteria are adequate perspectives to 
confront the complexity of the legal scenario without renouncing the concepts of unity 
and coherence.
The points described are the minimal elements required to advance in the 
construction of a legal philosophy from the transnational perspective. It is an ambitious 
research agenda, but it is a challenge that legal science must be willing to face if it wants to 
argue about the possibilities of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism as a political project. The 
political project cannot be unlinked from legal philosophy reflections. If that challenge 
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implies putting limits on other powers, incorporating the morality tension or reframing the 
terms in which, up until now, we have constructed the legal discourse in terms of unity, it 
is a necessary effort in regard to not abandoning the idea of constitutionalism.
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